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ABSTRACT 
This investigation treats the plausibility of "structurql" and "tensiqn" 
analyses of the relationships among crimes against persons, crimes 
against property, collective violence, urbap population and urban growth. 
It treats France during the century after 1830, Over the long run crimes 
against property appear to have declined sigpificantly in frequency, 
crimes against persons fluctuated mildly .without trend, and collective 
violence varied sharply from year to yFar; none.of them shows a.close 
correspondence to the pace of urban growth. Cross-gectiopal comparisons 
of the 86 Freqch departments at fiye-yeqr intervals from 1831 to 1861 
bring'out a strong relatiopship of property crime to urban population, a 
highly variable relationship of collective violence to urban populatioq, 
and no reliable relationship of personal crime to urban population. The 
relationships with the pace of.urban growth in all thepe regards qre weak 
or nonexistent. There is no detectable association between cripe and 
'collective violence. We interpret the weight of the evidence as against 
11 tension" arguments and voward '1s tructural" ones, 
URBANIZATION, CRIME AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 
1 
The linking of.crime, violence and disorder to urban growth must 
fall into the category of things people simply want to believe, for the 
belief rests.on.no substantial foundation of verified fact or systematic 
analysis. As =ompared with thg- sophisticati6n. of recent' efforts.'fo identify 
criminogenic environments within communities or to pin down the charac- 
teristics of individual rioters, the standard demonstration that aggregate 
rates of reported crime are higher for large places seems laughably inade- 
quate to the task of proving a causal connection between urbanization 
and criminality, just as the simple observation that riots occur mainly 
in cities falls far short of establishing that city life produces a pro- 
pensity to riot (see Shaw and McKay 1931, Bettman, Marshall, Jameson and 
Miles 1932, Boggs 1965, Christiansen 1960, Clinard 1964, Ferracuti 1969, 
Szabo 1960, Tobias 1967, Venter 1962, Wolfgang 1968). 
Our guess is that the conventional wisdom of these matters will 
turn out tci be a trifle true, but mainly false. True, in suggesting 
that the peculiar organization of cities and urban life shapes the means 
men adopt to express their.discontent and to hurt one another. False, 
in supposing that urban growth -- by dissolving social ties, disrupting 
existing controls, or disorienting newcomers to the city -- has a strong 
and consistent tendency to increase the level of crime, violence and dis- 
order. 
The research reported here nibbles at a corner of the problem. It 
is an attempt to try out various arguments linking violence to cities 
and to urbanization through a close examination of violent crime and col- 
lective violence in nineteenth-century France, It deals with France for 
two basic reasons: 
1. France of the nineteenth century's middle decades was under- 
going just the kind pf rapid urbanization and industrialization which 
is commonly said to generate disorder in the contemporary world, 
and French social critics of the time tended to believe that urband- 
zation was causing disordgr in both its individual and collective 
forms ; 
2 1  The data pvailable concerning urbanization, crime, and collective 
. viplence in France during that period are exceptionally rich and ex- 
ceptionally uniform, compared with the data available for any part 
of the world today or yesterday, 
We shall concentrate on the departments of France -- the 80 to 90 admip- 
istrative units into which the country divtded at the Revolution, Al- 
though the general ifvestigation we have undertaken include? analyses of 
individual communities and of time series for France as a whole, this 
. paper deals almost exclusively with cross-sectional comqarisons of depart- 
ments during seven sepanate census years of the nineteenth century. The 
main period under examination is 1831 to 1861, spanning France's first 
great modern surge of industrialization gnd urbanization. The research 
reported employs a variety of quantitative procedures to determine the 
relationships among a) crime and collective violence, on the one hand, 
and b) the concentration of the department's population in cities and 
the current rate of urban growth, on the other. 
The diverse theories whi~h link crime, collective violence, urban- 
ity and urbanization ordinarily invoke such phenomena as psychic states 
of individual migrants, encounters of families with the city, struggles 
of different groups of workers for power and fluctuations in the for- 
tunes of different sorts of social movements. The evidence in this 
paper belongs to a very different level of aggregation; it hgs a coarser 
grain. At best, we are in a position to distinguish between the implica- 
tions of two general kinds of argument: a) structural arguments stress- 
ing the impact of organizational setting on the form of individual and 
collective action; b) tension arguments treating a variety of disapproved 
behaviors as responses to strains and disorientations. 2 To the extent 
that diverse forms of "disorder" occur independently of each other and 
vary, as a function of their organizational setting we shall be inclined 
to give credence to structural argumentg. To the extent that they clus- 
ter together and correspond to the sheer pace of structural change we 
shall tend to accept tension arguments. 
The work at hand provides the opportunity to compare the two lines 
of argument' at several different points. We may ask whether three forms 
of "disorder" -- crimes against property, crimes against persons, and 
collective violence -- vary together. We may ask whether they vary as a 
function of the urbanity of the setting, and whether the patterns of 
variation are stable over time. We may ask whether they vary as a func- 
tion of the rate of change in the urbanity of the setting (as a function, 
that is, of urbanization), and whether those patterns of variation are 
stable over time. Finally, we may compare the strengths of relationship 
of the various forms of "disorder" to urbanity and to urbanization. 
These questions set the frame of the evidence in this paper. 
DATA AND PROCEDURES 
The data come from the files of an investigation of changes in the 
character of several different forms of conflict in western Europe, 
especially France, since about 1830. The sources of the three main bodies 
of information drawn on here are: 
1. published reports of the national censuses of France conducted 
in 1831, 1836, 1841, 1846, 1851, 1856, 186$, 1866, and 1872; 
2. coded descriptions of 771 inoidents of.collectiye violence oc- 
curring in France from 1830 to 1880, consisfing of every event 
involving at least one group of fifty persons or more in which some 
person or object was seized or damged.over resistance which wae 
encountered by trained readers of two national newspapers.for each 
day in the thirty-one year period; the coded information concern- 
ing the incidents came from French archives, political yearbooks 
and historical works as well as from the newspaper accounts; 
3. annual reports of criminal justice in France (the Compte 
g&e/ral - de . l'administration de la justice criminelle en France) 
for the same years. 
In each case, the data e'mployed here comprise only a small part of the 
information coded from the source. The machine-readable files of cen- 
sus data we have prepared, for example, include information concerning 
labor force characteristics, age-sex distribution, vital rates, migra- 
tion, and a great many other items; here we have used only urban popu- 
lation (persons in places of 10,000 or more) the total horsepower of 
steam engines currently operating in the department, net migration to 
the department in the previous five years, and total population. 
Let us distinguish clearly between urbanity and urbanization. The 
urbanity of a department, for our purposes, is the proportion of its 
population living in communes of 10,000 persons or more at a given point 
in time. The crimes and collective violence for which we are attempting - 
to account did not, by any means, occur exclusively in those cities of 
10,000 or more. The analyses reported here make no distinction between 
"urban" and "rural" events in this narrower sense. They provide no 
reliable means of inferring within what sorts of communities the events 
in.question occurred. Instead, we regard urbanity as a characteristic 
of the department as a whole. The probability that the influence of cities 
of 10,000 or more will radiate throughout departments averaging some 
300,000 persons in 2,000 square miles makes this seems a reasonable 
procedure. The urbanization of a department is the current rate of 
change in the proportion living in communes of 10,000 or more. Normally 
we calculate the urbanity of a department for a census year and its ur- 
banization for the five-year period since the previous census. Urbanity 
then, is our chief indicator of the structural condition pf the depart- 
ment. Urbanization represents its recent experience of tension-producing 
change. We supplement and specify these two main variables with infor- 
mation concerning the mechanization of industry and recent migration. 
But urbanity and urbanization remain the central issues. 
The data concerqing collective violence include a wide range of ob- 
servations of the organization of the participants, the character of the 
action, the nature of the setting, the stated objectives of the parties 
involved, and so on, but the information used here deals only with the 
magnitude of the collective violence as represented by the estimated num- 
ber of participants, the duration, and the number killed, wounded and 
arrested. The crime data actually include individual observations on a 
wide variety of offenses, but here we have selected and grouped together 
only a minority of them: crimes against persons (the number of persons 
accused of murder, poisoning, infanticide and patricide), crimes against 
property (the number of persons accused of any variety of theft or rob- 
bery) and willful destruction of property. 
The crime reports are, of course, open to all the usual defects of 
this sort of official statistic (Biderman 1966, Skolnick 1966, Reiss 1967, 
Graham 1969, Lane 1969, Pittman and Handy 1962, Newmann 1962, Lejins 1968, 
Chilton 1968, Gatre11 and Hadden 1972). Within those limits, the French 
r e p o r t s  have cons iderable  advantages: French c r i p i n a l  law and p o l i c e  
p r a c t i c e  c r y s t a l l i z e d  dur ing  t h e  Revolut ion and changed only s l i g h t l y  
and s lowly af te rward;  r e p o r t i n g  procedures  and c a t e g o r i e s  remained re -  
markably cons tan t  over  t h e  pe r iod  under s tudy .  The one change which 
deserves  s e r i o u s  a t t e n t i o n  i s  t h e  genera l  expansion of p o l i c e  f o r c e s  -- 
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  l a r g e  c i t i e s  of France -- from t h e  1830s onward (Bayley 
1971, Du Camp 1869, Le ~ l k r e  1964, Payne 1966, Stead 1957).  
Our ana lyses  pf t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among these  v a r i a b l e s  have gone 
through fou r  phases: 
1 )  t h e  s tudy  of long t r e n d s  i n  r epo r t ed  crime f o r  France a s  a  
whole and f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  departments ,  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  determine 
whether t h e  t iming of changes i n  c r i m i n a l  a c t i v i t y  corresponded t o  
t h e  t iming  of urban growth; 
2 )  c ros s - t abu la t ions  of r a t e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s e s  of c r imina l  
o f f enses  f o r  each census year  from 1831 t o  1861; 
3)  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s  of t h e  v a r i a b l e s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
u rban i ty ,  u rban iza t ion ,  o t h e r  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  c o l l e c t i v e  
v io l ence  and c r imina l  a c t i v i t y  a c r o s s  a l l  departments f o r  each cen- 
s u s  year  from 1831 t o  1861; 
4) t e s t i n g  of a  number of models l i n k i n g  those  v a r i a b l e s  v i a  
m u l t i p l e  r eg re s s ion  techniques .  
Here we o f f e r  an extremely condensed r e p o r t  of t he  f ind ings .  
Long-Run Trends i n  Crime and C o l l e c t i v e  Violence , 
Over t h e  century  from 1831 t o  1931, charges and conv ic t ions  f o r  
crimes a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  dec l ined  s t e a d t l y  i n  frequency. From a h igh  
p o i n t  of 174 persons  accused pe r  100,000 popula t ion  i n  1836, t h e  r a t e  
f e l l  t o  t h e  10 r e g i s t e r e d  i n  1931, In 1872 t h e  r a t e  i nc reased  Temporar- 
i l y  t o  100, i n  t h e  a f t e rma th  of t h e  Franco-Prussian War. But i n  1876 
i t  was down aga in ,  t o  72 p e r  100,000. A s  is  always t h e  case  wi th  crim- 
i n a l  s t a t i s t i c s ,  s e v e r a l  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  s t and  i n  t h e  way of any conf ident  
i q f ~ r e n ~ e  t h a t  t h e  a c t u a l  rate of t h e f t  ,and robbery i n  France as a whole 
was dec l in ing .  F i r q t ,  t h e  number of such o f f enses  r epo r t ed  r o s e  some- 
what a s  t h e  number of persons  charged and t b e  number convic ted  went 
down (Davidovitch 1970).  One might q l l e g e  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c e  were becoming 
more l e n i e n t  and/or  more i n e f f i c i e n t  i n  i g e n f i f y i n g  f u l p r i t s  and br ing-  
i n g  them t o  t r i a l ,  From what we know of t h e  o rgan iza t ion  and p r q c f i c e  
of t h e  French p o l i c e ,  w e  doubt t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  bu t  cannot d i sprove  
i f .  Second, i t  is d i s t a n t l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  a s  t h e  pentury wore on an  in-  
c r eas ipg  p ropor t iqn  of cr imes a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  were r e f e r r e d  t o  minor 
c o u r t s  inq tead  of coming be fo re  t h e  Agsize Courts frqm whiph ou r  d a t a  
come, However, t h e  t o t a l  number of persons  charged before  t h e  p r i n c i p a l ,  
l o c a l  c o u r t s  -- t h e  t r i bunaux  c o r r e c t i o n n e l s  -- dec l ined  i r r e g u l a r l y  
fropl 624 p e r  100,000 popula t ion  i n  1831 t o  514 i n  1930, wi th  h ighe r  and 
lpwqr poin t6  i n  between. I n  f a c t ,  t h e  main t r end  runs  n e i t h e r  up nor  
d o p ,  but  swings around a va lue  of 550. So i t  is  y n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  s t r i k i n g  
d e c l i n e  i n  s e r i o u s  p rope r ty  crimes t r i e d  be fo re  t h e  Ass izes  r e s u l t e d  
simply from, t h e  t r a n s f e r  0.f o f f enses  t o  t h e  minor j u r i s d i c t i o n .  Our 
p r o v i s i o n a l  conclus ion  is  t h a t  t h e f t  and robbery d i d ,  indeed ,  d e c l i n e  
i n  frequency. 
Figure 1 about h e r e  
A t  f i r s t  g l ance ,  t h e  conclusion i s  s u r p r i s i n g .  It c e r t a i n l y  f l i e s  
i n  t h e  f a c e  of t h e  i d e a  t h a t  "disorder"  rises wi th  t h e  spread  of urban- 
i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i a l  l i f e .  One might we l l  be tempted t o  a t t r i b u t e  i t  t o  
p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of t h e  French, o r  of t h e i r  s t a t i s t i c a l  r e p o r t i n g  system. 
Yet France was n o t  a lone .  I n  England and Wales, G a t r e l l  and Hadden 
(1972) have made a c l o s e  s tudy  of crimes known t o  t h e  p o l i c e  from 1805 
through 1892. Up ' t o  t h e  middle of t h e  cen tu ry ,  they  f i n d  some. evidence 
of an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  of repor ted  p rope r ty  cr ime,  bu t  they  p o i n t  
out t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  accompanied a  g r e a t  expansion of  B r i t i s h  p o l i c e  
f ~ r c e s ,  and may have been caused by t h a t  expansion. I n  any c a s e ,  t h e i r  
s t r o n g e r  evidence f o r  t h e  pe r iod  a f t e r  1850 i n d i c a t e s  a  d e c i s i v e  d e c l i n e  
i n  p rope r ty  crime up t o  t h e  cen tu ry ' s  end. They a l s o  a rgue  thac  nine-  
teenth-century cr imes a g a i n s t  p roper ty  r o s e  and f e l l  w i t h  economic hard- 
s h i p ,  w i th  year-to-year f l u c t u a t i o n s  fo l lowing  t h e  t r a d e  c y c l e ,  and t h e  
d e c l i n e  l a t e r  i n  t h e  cen tu ry  presumably a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  gene ra l  pros- 
p e r i t y  of t h e  V i c t o r i a n  e r a .  I n  t h e i r  view, t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  reversed  
i t s e l f  i n  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  cen tu ry ,  so  t h a t  a f t e r  1900 p r o p e r t y  crimes tended 
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to rise in times of prosperity. Their view is compatible with the large 
increase in the British crime rate -- especially for property offenses -- 
after World War I (McClintock, Avison and Rose 1968). Our own tentative 
explanations of the decline in French rates give greater weight.to the 
effects of policing itself. Neither interpretation of the nineteenth- 
century experience lends much credence to urbanization as a cause of crime. 
Detailed information for the period 1831 to 1871 in France gives 
further support to the observation of a general decline in crimes against 
property. Frequencies for almost all types of property offenses fell 
throughout the period, although the rate of decline varied with the 
offense. While all types of thefts and robbery showed declines, arson 
, and iandalism displayed an overall increase, with marked year-to-year 
variations. In 1856, 1861, and 1866, for example, arson of.buildings 
was at its height (6 per 100,000 in each of the three years), while in ' 
1831 and 1836 the rates had been 3 and 2. Combined with all other crimes 
against property, however, arson and vandalism do not change the trend. 
In general, crimes against property declined. 
The inspection of the trends for departments at different levels of 
urbanity (Figure 2) makes it clearer what happened. Rates dropped steadily 
in all classes of departments, especially in the most urban and the most. 
rural ones. In$the big-city departments, we fipd a dramatic drop -- from 
24 to 16 per 100,000 population -- in the period 1836-1841, and a steady 
decline thereafter. By 1861 the absolute range of the rates had narrowed 
cons iderably :  f rom'2 ;8  i n  t h e  l e a s t  urban departments t o  5.9 i n  t h e  most 
urban. Furthermore, t h e  progress ion  of r a t e s  from r u r a l  t o  urban had 
become .more o r d e r l y  than  i n  1831. 
F igure  2 about h e r e  
The v a r i a t i o n s  i n  crimes a g a i n s t  persons  dur ing  t h e  same per iod  
d isp layed  a  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n .  Throughout t h e  century t h e  r a t e s  of crime 
a g a i n s t  persons  remained much lower than  t h o s e  of crimes a g a i n s t  p roper ty .  
They a l s o  f l u c t u a t e d  wi th in  a narrower range.  During t h e  t h i r t y  yea r s  
from 1831 t o  1861, f o r  example, t h e  o v e r a l l  r a t e  f e l l  from 19 t o  10 ,  
w i th  an in t e rmed ia t e  h igh  po in t  of 18  i n  185.1. From 1872 t h e  pe r sona l  
crime r a t e  r o s e  slowly t o  1881, went down t o  i t s  lowest l e v e l  i n  1886, 
then  r o s e  t o  i t s  h ighes t  p o i n t ' o v e r  t h e  nex t  t h r e e  i n t e r v a l s .  The . f luc -  
t u a t i o n s  r e v e a l  no gene ra l  t r end  whatsoever.  While crimes a g a i n s t  prop- 
e r t y  were d e c l i n i n g  and crimes aga'inst persons  were f l u c t u a t i n g  without  
t r e n d ,  t h e  s u i c i d e  r a t e  continued t o  r i s e  dur ing  t h e  n ine t een th  century .  
Only a  l i t t l e  before  t h e  t u r n  o f ' t h e  cen tu ry  (about t h e  t ime t h a t  Durkheim 
was s tudy ing  them s o  i n t e n s e l y )  d i d  they  e n t e r  a  slow d e c l i n e .  I n  short,  
pe r sona l  crimes d i s p l a y  no master  p a t t e r n  of  movement. 
Figure 3 about h e r e  
C o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  f l u c t u a t e d  independent ly of crimes a g a i n s t  
prope r ty  and crimes a g a i n s t  persons ,  and much more ,sharp ly  than  e i t h e r  
one of them. F i g u r e . 3  shows t h e  number of v i o l e n t  i n c i d e n t s  we .have .  
enumerated i n . e a c h  y e a r  from 1830 through 1880. The number r an  h igh  i n  
1830, 1832, 1848, 1851 and 1871 -- major pe r iods  of t r a n s f e r  and consol i -  
da t ion  of power a t  a  n a t i o n a l  s c a l e .  The y e a r s  from 1835 t o  1838, from 
1842 t o  1845 and from 1851 t o  1867 produced n e g l i g i b l e  numbers of  
d i s tu rbances .  C o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  swung f a r  more widely and r a p i d l y  from 
yea r  t o  yea r  than  cr imes a g a i n s t  persons and p rope r ty  eve r  d id .  Further-  
more, t h e  swings i n  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  d i d  no t  correspond t o  t hose  of 
u rban iza t ion ,  which i n  France as a whole w a s  moderate i n  t h e  18309, 
a c c e l e r a t i n g  but  i n t e r r u p t e d  by economic c o n t r a c t i o n  (and perhaps by t h e  
r evo lu t ion  of 1848 i t s e l f )  i n  t h e  1840s, and moving wi th  unprecedented 
speed i n  t h e  1850s; i n  f a c t ,  t h e  gross  c o r r e l a t i o n  over t ime i s  nega t ive ;  
r ap id  urban growth, l i t t l e  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  C o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  f luc-  
t u a t e d  much more d i r e c t l y  a s  a  func t ion  of t h e  quickening and slowing of 
s t r u g g l e s  f o r  power a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  
To sum up, we have made fou r  broad obse rva t ions  about long-term 
t r e n d s ,  bu t  have n o t  a t tempted t o  co r robora t e  them i n  d e t a i l :  
1 )  Urban growth cont inued a t  vary ing  paces throughout t h e  n ine t een th  
century ,  but  t h e r e  was no p a r t i c u l a r  tendency f o r  pe r iods  of r ap id  
growth t o  be p e r i o d s  of h igh  crime r a t e s .  
2)  . Crimes a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  dec l ined  wi th  ha rd ly  a  break throughout 
t h e  century  from 1831 t o  1931. 
3) Crimes against persons fluctuated considerably from 1831 to 
1931, with a minor and irregular decline occurring during the study 
period of 1831-1861. 
4 )  The year-to-year fluctuation of collective violence was much 
greater than that of crime. It did not correspond to fluctuations 
in the rate of urbanization, but did correspond to the rise and fall 
of struggles for power at the national level. 
We only intend these general observations on trends as stimuli to further 
inquiry and as'context for the detailed geographic comparisons we are 
about to report. We believe them to be correct, but are unable to rule 
out all the uncertainties which beset the interpretation of such long 
trends. In particular, it remains possible that the actual number of 
property crimes committed (as opposed to the number of persons tried for 
such crimes) did not fall so precipitously as we have said -7 that the 
figures we are interpreting reflect changes in police and judicial prac- 
tice or effectiveness. Again, we are unable to study the short-run 
impact of fluctuations in urbanization on crime, for lack of reliable 
data on urban population outside of census years, Nevertheless, the over- 
all trends at a national scale cast doubt.on any close relationship be- 
tween crime in general and collective violence. They also make implaus- 
ible any close connection between these.forms of "disorder'.' and the pace 
of urbanization. ' 
Variation Among Departments in 1841, 1846 and 1851 
We have attempted to identify the effect of urbanity, urbanization 
and several related phenomena on crime and collective violence in France 
by means of separate cross-sectional analyses for each census year from 
1831 through 1861. In each case, we have studied the product-moment cor- 
relations of all the variables involved over the 86 departments which 
comprised the France of this period, and have tested a number of alter- 
native models of the relationships among those variables by means of mul- 
tiple regression. The main hypotheses we pursued were very simple: 
1) that property crimes, being facilitated by the accessibility of 
wealth and the ease of escaping detection, would tend to rise with 
the urbanity of the department; 
2) that crimes against persons would display significant regional 
effects related to the acceptability of regulating differences 
through interpersonal violence, but would be essentially unrelated 
to urban population; 
3) that the relationship of the level of crime to the current pace 
of urbanization would be small, and largely spurious, due to the 
association of current urban growth with the existeng concentration3f 
the area's population in cities; 
4) that collective violence would fluctuate between urban and rural 
concentration'depending on the nature of the major political issues 
dividing the country at the time, but would in no case be.closely 
related to crime. 
This paper does not present evidence on all these hypothses. Our analyses 
have, for instance, turned up some important regional patterns in crimes 
against persons -- for example the enormously high rates of homicide, 
true to the stereotype, in Corsica -- but we do not present them here. 
Nor does the paper go very far into the political issues dividing France 
in 1841, 1846 and 1851, or the nature of the actions which comprise our 
grand totals of collective violence. We concentrate on the quantitative 
relationships among aggregate levels of crime and collective violence, 
on the one hand, and gross structural characteristics of departments, 
on the ~ther. 
We have, furthermore, implicitly taken the pattern of repression 
(especially policing) to be irrelevant. On our own argument, that is a 
poor assumption. We have not, however, been able to index the govern- 
ment's repressive capacity or propensity any more directly than via the 
number of troops stationed in the department. So the fact that the re- 
sults came out generally as expected still leaves uncomfortably open the 
extent to which they result from selective governmental response to col- 
lective action and to illegal behavior. 
In this analysis we correlate absolute numbers (of persons in cities, 
participants in collective violence, individuals accused of crimes against 
property, and so on) rather than rates and proportions. That procedure 
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avoids t h e  confusions of  r a t e  c o r r e l a t i o n  and provides a  s e p a r a t e  measure 
of t h e  e f f e c t s  of s c a l e .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, i t  produces mis leadingly  
high zero-order c o r r e l a t i o n s ,  s i n c e  each c o e f f i c i e n t . i n c l u d e s  t h e  s c a l e  
e f f e c t .  I n  ou r  f u l l  ana lyses ,  we d e a l  w i th  t h i s  problem b y ' p a r t i a l i n g  
each zero-order ma t r ix  f o r  t o t a l  popula t ion ;  he re  we omit t h a t  intermed- 
i a t e  s t e p .  
We only r e p o r t  che r e s u l t s  f o r  1841, 1846 and 1851, t h e  t h r e e  
census yea r s  f o r  which we have t h e  f u l l e s t  range of d a t a  a t  our  d i sposa l .  
The yea r s  1841 and 1846 f a l l  i n t o  a  r e l a t i v e l y  q u i e t  phase of Louis 
P h i l i p p e ' s  J u l y  Monarchy. There were 36 d i s tu rbances  i n  1841, no tab ly  
t a x  r e b e l l i o n s  and d i f f e r e n t  forms of r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  census.  (The 
census was widely -- and n o t  e n t i r e l y  wrongly -- bel ieved  t o  b e . t h e  open- 
. . 
i n g  wedge f o r  new. t axa t ion . )  Some 35,000 people took p a r t  i n  t h e  y e a r ' s  
36 d i s tu rbances .  There were 28 d i s tu rbances  i n  1846, many of them t h e  
f i r s t  p a r t  of a  s t r i n g  of food r i o t s  i n d i r e c t l y  s t imu la t ed  by t h e  poor 
ha rves t  of t h a t  f a l l .  Perhaps 40,000 people t o o k . p a r t  i n  t h e  d i s tu rbances  
of 1846. 1851 was t h e  l a s t  year  of t h e  Second Republic ,  and a  t u r b u l e n t  
one. The second Republic  had come i n t o  be ing  through t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
overthrow of t h e  J u l y  Monarchy i n  1848, and came t o  an end f o r  p r a c t i c a l  
purposes ( d e s p i t e  i t s  cont inuing  e x i s t e n c e  a s  a  f i c t i o n  f o r  a few more 
yea r s )  wi th  Louis Napoleon's coup d f 6 t a t  o f  December, 1851. The 93 
d i s tu rbances  of 1851 (and t h e  roughly 91,000 p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  d i s tu rbances )  
came almost e n t i r e l y  i n  t h e  widespread r e b e l l i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  coup. A l -  
though i t  was one of  t h e  l a r g e s t  popular u p r i s i n g s  France produced i n  t h e  
n ine t een th  century ,  t h e  r e b e l l i o n  f a i l e d .  Our t h r e e  y e a r s ,  t hen ,  d i f f e r e d  
cons iderably  i n  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  and e x t e n t  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  
Tables 1 - 3 about here 
The matrix for 1841 (Table 1) sets the pattern for the other two. 
It shows a strong positive association between urban population and crimes 
against property, a weak positive association between urban population 
and crimes against persons, and further strong positive associations with 
the number wounded and arrested in collective violence -- which measure, 
in effect, how vigorously police and troops put down protests and demon- 
strations, rather than-how many protests and demonstrations took place. 
Urbanization shows weaker positive relationships with all these.variables; 
they are weak enough, in fact, to reflect no more than the association 
between urbanization and urbanity. There are some apparent relationships 
between crime ,and collective violence which deserve a closer look,later 
on. 
The matrices for 1846 and 1851 (Tables 2 and 3) greatly resemble 
the one for 1841. There are two important differences. First, urbanity 
and urbanization were very closely associated in 1846 (r = ,948). 
From 1841 to 1846, that is, urban growth was.almost exactly proportional 
to the gxieting urban population, while in the periods 1836-41 and 1846-51 
there wae.considerable disparity between the patterns, That aeeociation 
between urbanization and urbanity in 1846 makes the correlatione of these 
two variables with the other variables in the set more similar than in 
the matrices for 1841 and 1851. Second, the urbanity of collective vio- 
lence varies among th8 yeare. Xn the first two years we find zero-order 
correlations of +.287 and +.253 between urban population and participants 
in collective violence, whereas the rural base of much of the 1851 ineur- 
r e c t i o n  produces no c o r r e l a t i o n  a t  a l l :  +.024. 
Because of t h e  cons iderable  a s s o c i a t i o n  among ou r  explana tory  v a r i -  
a b l e s  and t h e  i n c l u s i o n  of a  s c a l e  e f f e c t  i n  t h e  zero-order c o r r e l a t i o n s  
t h e  t h r e e  m a t r i c e s  l eave  t h e  p a t t e r n s  of r e l a t i o n s h i p  among t h e  v a r i a b l e s  
unc lear .  Table 4  provides  some c l a r i f i c a t i o n  by summarizing t h e  s tandar -  
d ized  p a r t i a l  r e g r e s s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  and r e s i d u a l s  f o r  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
mu l t ip l e - r eg res s ion  ana lyses  we have performed f o r  t h e  t h r e e  yea r s .  A 
glance a t  t h e  r e s i d u a l s  w i l l  make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  i n  none of t h e  yea r s  d id  
t h i s  s e t  of explana tory  v a r i a b l e s  account f o r  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  amount of t h e  
va r i ance  i n  cr imes a g a i n s t  persons.  For cr imes a g a i n s t  p rope r ty ,  on t h e  
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o t h e r  hand, R ran  c o n s i s t e n t l y  c l o s e  t o  .90,  l a r g e l y  because of t h e  
s t r o n g  a s s o c i a t i o n  between proper ty  crimes and urban popula t ion .  On t h e  
whole, t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  account f o r  much less of t h e  va r i ance  i n  co l l ec -  
t i v e  v i o l e n c e ,  and t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  i n  ques t ion  a r e  cons iderably  l e s s  con- 
s t a n t  from year  t o  yea r .  That r e s u l t ,  o f  course ,  fo l lows  d i r e c t l y  from 
what we a l r e a d y  know about t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  geographic d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  i n  1841, 1846 and 1851. 
Table 4  about he re  
The m u l t i p l e  r eg re s s ions  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  e f -  
f e c t s  of u rban iza t ion  and of u rban i ty .  Nei ther  one of them has a  s t rong  
and r e l i a b l e  e f f e c t  on crimes a g a i n s t  persons ,  but  a sha rp  d i f f e r e n c e  
. . . , * - 
between them appears  when i t  comes t o  cr imes a g a i n s t  p,rope.rty. I n  each 
of t h e  t h r e e  y e a r s  t h e r e  i s  a  s t r o n g  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between proper ty  
crimes and urbanity, even after allowance for the effects of mechanization, 
migration and urbanization. The beta-coefficients for urbanization vary 
from - .18 to +.24, and are in each case smaller than the corresponding 
coefficients for urbanity. These conclusions are least certain for 
1846, where the geographic similarity of the patterns for urbanization 
and for urbanity was so great as to make it hard to distinguish their 
effects statistically. Even in that year the coefficient for urbanity 
(+.57) is considerably larger than the coefficient for urbanization (+.24). 
The analysis casts considerable doubt on the current rate of urban growth 
as a cause of crime, hence indirectly on explanations of crime as a re- 
sponse to tension. The insignificance of net migration into the depart- 
ment as a predictor of crime reinforces our doubt. And the moderate 
negative coefficients for the regression of crimes against property on 
steam power (-.I7 and -.20 in the two years for which we have steam power 
data) suggest that something about the organization of cities as such, 
rather than the presence of mechanized industry, promotes crime against 
property. 
As expected, the predictability of different features of collective 
violence from structural characteristics of departments varies consider- 
ably from year to year. The multiple regression specifies some of the 
relationships in interesting ways. In all years we discover an impor- 
tant positive relationship between the frequency of arrests for partici- 
pation in collective violence and the urbanity of the department., The 
relationship of arrests to steam power and to urbanization, on the other 
hand, is negative, and that to net migration nonexistent. We attribute 
this to the concentration of police and military forces in the urban 
departments. Although the pattern for 1846 goes in a different direction, 
the data concerning wounding (which is done mainly by troops and police) 
suggest the same conclusion. 
The multiple regressions, finally, produce an important observation 
concerning the possible relationship between crime and collective violence. 
Geographically speaking, there is none. The largest coefficient linking 
crime to participants in collective violence is the .08 for crimes against 
persons in 1841. Although urbanity affects the patterns of crime and the 
patterns of collective violence in different, complex ways, there is no 
evidence at all that crime and collective violence are interchangeable, 
or even interdependent. 
To sum up the analysis, let us recast a number of the multiple. 
regressions for 1851 -- the year with the largest number of participants 
in collective violence -- in the form of a path diagram. The only new 
information in the diagram (Figure 4) concerns the relationships among 
the variables we have previously treated as independent. It is reassuring 
to see that they come out in the usual way: with urbanization a.function 
of net migration and of steam power, and so on. The diagram dramatizes ' 
the insignificance of the impact of urbanization on crimes against prop- 
erty and on participation in collective violence. It restates the strong 
impact (in 1851) on participation in collective violence, And it reminds 
us that crime and collective violence do not vary together. 
Figure 4 about here 
Conclusions 
The l a r g e s t  conclus ions  one camdraw from t h i s  a n a l y s i s  a r e  nega t ive  
ones.  In  a number of d i f f e r e n t  ways t h e  gene ra l  p a t t e r n s  of  crime and 
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  in .n ine t een th -cen tu ry  France t e l l  a g a i n s t  arguments 
t r a c i n g  e i t h e r  one back t o  t h e  t e n s i o n s  genera ted  by u rban iza t ion .  Once 
allowance i s  made f o r  o t h e r .  f a c t o r s  e a s i l y  confused wi th  u rban iza t ion ,  
t h e  geographic d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of  crime and c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  do no t  
correspond t o  .the p a t t e r n  of urban growth. Nor do cr imes a g a i n s t  per-  
sons ,  cr imes a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  and c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  correspond t o  each 
o t h e r ,  e i t h e r  i n  t h e i r  geographic..distribution o r  i n  t h e i r  f l u c t u a t i o n  
over  t ime,  The gene ra l  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  frequency of cr imes a g a i n s t  
p rope r ty  over  F rance ' s  major per iod  of u rban iza t ion  l i k e w i s e  weighs a g a i n s t  
any d i r e c t  and p o s i t i v e  l i n k  between t h e  two. 
The a l t e r n a t i v e  l i n e  of argument t o  which our  ana lyses  l end  support  
t r e a t s  crime apd c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  a s  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  v a r i e t i e s  of  be- 
hav io r  whose f r equenc ie s  a r 9 . s t r o n g l y  shaped by t h e  s t r u c t u r e s  of t h e  
s o c i a l  s e t t i n g s  i n  which men f i n d  themselves -- r a t h e r  t han  t h e  r a t e s  
a t  which those  s t r u c t u r e s  are. changing. Urban s e t t i n g s ,  n o t  t h e  process  
of u rban iza t ion  as such ,  a r e  conducive t o  cr imes a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  and t o  
c e r t a i n  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  v io lence .  Our f i n d i n g s  r e v e a l ,  i n  f a c t ,  
a s t r o n g  and p e r s i s t e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  frequency of p rope r ty  
cr imes and t h e  u r b a n i t y  of t h e  department i n  which they  occur .  The 
geography of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  v a r i e s  much more d e c i s i v e l y  and r a p i d l y  
than  t h a t  of  cr ime,  depending: on t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  
which l i e s  behind i t .  . In  n ine teenth-century  France,  t h e  r e p r e s s i o n  of 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  ( a s  measured by a r r e s t s  and t h e  l i k e )  
was more c l e a r l y  and p e r s i s t e n t l y  urban than  w a s  t h e  v io l ence  i t s e l f .  
Many kinds of."tensionl' explanation for crime or collective violence 
can survive this particular attack. One simple way to hold on to the 
idea of bo'th phenomena as responses to normlessness (or some related 
condition) is to claim that normlessness is intrinsic to urban organiza- 
. .  tion itself instead of..a consequence of change in that organization.. 
. Although we doubt this revision-.as much as we doubt the original statement, 
, . our evidence cannot rule it.out. .. Likewise, a great range of "structural" 
. . explanations remain compatible with our findings: the opportunities 
for criminal activity, the costs of organizing to carry it out, the avail- 
ability of models for crime all.vary systematically with urbanity. Our 
gross data do not discriminate effectively among these and many other 
possible factors. 
Nevertheless the findings deserve attention as a commentary on 
existing theories and as a guide to further investigation. Although we 
have concentrated this report *on 1841, 1846 and 1851, the less complete 
results for 1831, 1836, 1856.and 1861 come out essentially the same. 
Over three important decades of urbanization and industrialization in 
a major western country the .actual geographic patterns of crime and col- 
lective violence fail to conform.to reasonable inferences from "tension" 
A theories -- including those specifically formulated for the France of 
that period by such sociological.historians as Louis Chevalier. It 
would be prudent at least to suspend the use of such theories as explana- 
tions until they have received closer scrutiny. That closer scrutiny 
should, of course, repair the weaknesses of the investigation we have 
reported here by dealing more directly with the immediate settings, 
precipitants and personnel-of.crime_and collective violence. Someone 
must erase (or confirm) the possibility that changes or variations in 
reporting procedures account for-the pattern of findings we have report- 
ed here. And the investigation must go beyond nineteenth-century France 
to other urbanizing .times and places. 
The lines of further inquiry we propose treat criminal activity and 
collective violence as quite different sorts of behavior, each requiring 
substantially different explanations and methods of investigation. No 
doubt "crime" will eventually decompose into a number of different kinde 
of behavior whbse common property.will reduce s~ the fact ehet police 
and other epecielf ets in cse%cion are chetged wleh their euppreeeian; 
if' so, the things we will be able to Bay l n  genarel about "crimet' wall 
be etaternentb about the way suppxeeeion works, We euepect, however, 
. . that the various crimes which involve physical attacks on one person by 
another ordinarily occur, together, and depend on the rules and expec- 
. tations'small groups learn in .regulating their differences, The Wolfgang- 
, , Ferracuti,notion of "eubculturee of violence" provides a plausible start- 
. ing point Eor'the explanation of=.voriatione in this sort o f  behavior, 
We expect, on the other.hand, that the explanations o f  major vari- 
ations in property crimes will ISe in three main sets of variables: 
1) the relative ease wi th  whish individuals can remove property from the 
ce~kxef o f  oehex individuale!arrd group@ An one eettin~ ex ansfher (which 
will, to be sure, Berpand en the d@finiltiens e f  "property" prevailing 
in the setting); 2) the ways.in which different,groups of poor people 
. . 
-- . -  - . . are drawn into .the social..organization of the setting, especially with. 
.. . . respect to the'general relations.established'between them and those in 
. . 
. - . the saine. setgfng-.who control: more property; 3) - the extent to which 
. . .  . . acquiring'property-makes. i.t:possible for people.to carry on their valued 
. . day-to-day.activities, and;,.to..-which not having property makes these 
. . .... . . activities impossible., Left.tin:this form; our,proposals are vague, and 
. .  . .  partly tautological. Nonethe:less,.they point: away from a search for 
individual and-group disorganization as a cause of crime, and toward the 
analysis of the social organization of behavior settings which has been 
undertaken in very different ways by Erving Goffman, Arthur Stinchcombe 
and Sarah Boggs.- 
As for collective violence, we view it as a by-product of collective 
efforts to exert disputed rights.. In the long European experience 
we have been studying, we find two broad types of action behind most 
instances of collective violence; In the one, an agent of authority 
lays claim to some valued resource -- a person, land, money, property, 
or something else -- and members of the affected population forcibly re- 
sist that claim. Violent resistance to taxation, which was probably 
the most common origin of lazge~scale collective violence in Europe as 
a whole-from 1500 to the present, illustrates the sort of action involved. 
Food riots, antiLconscription rebellions and many attacks on the police 
have essentially.the same character. In the other kinds of action, a 
group of people visibly lays claim to certain objects or actions, and 
some other group -- most frequently agents of government -- forcibly 
resist. either the. symbolic -statement.:.of the claim or its actual exercise. 
The insurrection in which..rebels-seize governmenta1,buildings falls 
into this category, but-.so-.does.,:the,.typical violent demonstration. The 
collective violence is a by-product in the sense that 1) agents of auth- 
ority.seize a'great many valued;.resources in essentially the same way 
without forcible resistance,.and.2) inany groups lay collective claims 
without meeting immediate retaliation; given the initial action, thes 
.presence.or absence of violence depends on.the availability of organized 
..groups prepared,:to'challenge ...the claims being made. 
.Laying out our ideas.wncerning the conditions under which,such,, 
claims and counter-claims appear would take us far beyond the purposes 
of this particular report. Yet it-should be clear that if our general 
approach to the problem is-correct the prevailing pace of change, the 
extent of individual malaise and the rate at which social ties are being 
dissolved should have little..dkrect relationship to the amount of col- 
lective violence. Instead, the .structure of power, the capacity of ,de- 
prived groups for collective. action, the forms of repression employed 
by the authorities and the-disparities between the weak and the.power- 
ful in shared understandings.about.col1ective rights to action and to 
use.' of. valued .resources'.will .provide the chief explanations .of. the appear- 
ance and disappearance of violence on the large scale. 
' 
1 I 
PICURE 1: PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
' . . ISOr . PER 1 0 0 , 0 b 0  POPULATION FOR CENSUS YEARS, 1 8 2 6 - 1 9 6 2  
- .  
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 
- 
U) N U) i5 U) N 0 (0 
<U * m rC Q <U Q m rr) .. (D a0 - 2 Q Q '  - - 0 - Q, - 5 
FIGURE 2: PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY PER 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  POPULATION 
BY URBANITY OF DEPARTMENT, 1831. TO 1861 . . 
BIG C1T.Y. : MORE THAN 15 PERCENT OF THE 
27 
POPULATION IN CITIES OF 0,000 3 0 F . . ,  ' , OR MORE 




BIG- CITY DEPARTMENTS - 
, . . .  
ALL DEPARTMENTS 
1 - RURAL DEPARTMENTS 
MORE 
. . FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF DISTURBANCES AND PARTICIPANTS 
(IN THOUSAND) IN DISTURBANCES, 1830-1880 
220 r I - No. of DISTURBANCES 
---- No. of PARTICIPANTS 
. ..- .-s. . . - .  . - - - 
. a 
, ~ Q ) R B  41 STANDARDIZED RECRESSION COEFFICIENTS AMONG VARIABLES A ~ C T I N C  CRX'& 
' AMINST PROPERTY, 1851 
, ... ... - - -  
Table 1: zero-order Correlat ions of Selected Indicators  
of Crime, Col lect ive  Violence and S t ruc tura l  
Charac te r i s t i cs  of French Departments i n  1841 
. , 
'urbanization . '  +.594 ' -- . . 
N e t  migration +.532 +.500 -- 
Total  population +.617 +.I79 +.384 -- 
. . 
Par t ic ipan ts  i n  
co l l ec t i ve  violence +.287 +.I38 +.068 ' +. 341 -- 
Kil led i n  co l lec t -  
, , i ve  violence +.002 -.001 -.lo5 +.I38 +.go7 -- 
. Wounded i n  co l lec t -  
, . ,  i ve  violence +.a89 +.339 +.'402 +.655 +.535 +.242 -- 
Arrested i n  col- 
l e c t i v e  violence +.796 +.361 +.381 +.549 +.483 +.I72 +.832 -- 
Crimes against  
persons . +.I86 +.055 '+.lo6 +.227 . .. +.154 +.I12 .+;224, +.134 -- 
crimes against  
property +.912 +.393 +.478 +.711 +.260 -.004 +.860 +.748 +.I62 
Table 2.' ' Zero-Order Correlations of Selected Indicators of Crime, Collective violende 
and ~tructural Characteristics of French Departments in 1846 : 
. . 
' urbanization- 
net .? igrat ion,  . .  ( , +.585 + . 5 8 0 .  , .  . . . 
. . . . 
2 ,  
, total popularion +.678 +;698 +..292 ' " ' ,. ; , ,'. . . . . ,  . 
. , 
, . . . 
+.'507 +.572 +.229, +.689 a . ,,steam power . . . , . . 
5 ,  
participants, 
killed -.012 -.026 -0039 -;017 -.049 +.272 
wounded +.204 +.230 ' +.087 +.266 +.262 +.552 +-634 
arrested +.442 +.hog +.233 +.348 +.280 +.526 +.714 +.a59 . I 
persons 
crimes agaimt +.893 +.868 +.540 +.713 +.425 +a204 +.008 +.294 +.447 +.226 
property 
.Table 3 : .  Zero-Order Cor re l a t ions  o f . S e l e c t e d  I n d i c a t o r s  of Crime, C o l l e c t i v e  
. . .  .Violence and S t r u c t u r a l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  French Departments i n  1851 
d 
k 
, t a *  . u 
0) '. is $ 
arc 
& . d U  
r) 0 
gJ , ; 'Z 2 
al b d  . 
4J (d 0 
vr, , P(v 
N e t  Migra t ion  +.454 +. 262 
T o t a l  Popula t ion  +.706 +.387 +.301 ' . 
Steam Power +.470 +.381 +.286 '+.616. 
P a r t i c i p a n t s  . +.024 -.006 -.I58 -.I43 -.053 
K i l l e d  +.714 +.307 +.I34 +.359 +.202 +.578 
Wounded +.el8 +.348 +.275 +.453 +.245 +-423 +-911 
Arrested +.545 +.233 +.I88 +.274 +.I26 +.446 +.617 +.691 
Crimes a g a i n s t  +.I29 +.063 . +.008 +.044' +.053 -.047 +.050 +.092 +.072 
Persons  
Crimes aiainst ' +.930 +.495 +.899 +.712 +.347 ,--004 +.676 +.769 +.465 
P rope r ty  . .  . 
. . . . 
, . .. Table 4:. standardized r e g r e d i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  . . . . 
. .  . fo.r each dependent variable for  1841,  
. . . . 
. ... . .  
. . . . 1846 aria 1851 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Dependent Re8 idual 
Variable Urbanity S t e m  Port-er UrLariizat,ian :* i:;ration T.popalation "artici;),~nt.s 
. . - - - - -- -~ ~ 
' ~ ~ ~ b ~ f  .. ' , : . ' 
Wounded', 
. . ,1841 . ,9356 1 . -  . . 9.2668 . .0101 .0207 l 2956 .3017 
1846 a0638 , . .-,4050 ,,' '-01991 , 0,2431 0344 , ,1801) .7921 
1851 . .9688' ' ' ,  -.lo42 . -00928 -00314 - 0674 03792 03799 
. . , . . .
'Nwber k i  1 ied 
. 1841 0.2768 . .0519 -,0425 ,0212 l 9889 .3206 
1846 , 02334, . -05075 , a -air876 ' 00044 1082 l 6555 a ,8916 




1841 a8298 - -0 1756 00230 -00354 l 2791 05281 
1846 ' 07305 - .4G77 - 1560 - l 0550 - 1035 o77ti7 07126 
1851 a6147 -0 1317 - l 0477 l 0277 - l 0137 l 4265 l 7060 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The Canada Counci l  and t h e  National  Science Foundation supported 
t h e  r e sea rch  r epor t ed  i n  t h i s - p a p e r .  W e  are g r a t e f u l  t o  Cindy Aron, 
Joan Baker, Sue Richardson, Ann.OIShea and V i r g i n i a  Perk ins  f o r  r e sea rch  
a s s i s t a n c e .  Other r e c e n t  r e p o r t s  of t h e  l a r g e r  i n q u i r y  t o  which t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  belongs a r e  L. T i l l y  1971 and 1972, R. T i l l y  
1970, Rule and T i l l y  1972, Shor te r  and T i l l y  1971a, 1971b, 1971c, 
Snyder and T i l l y  1972, Lees and T i l l y  1972, C .  T i l l y  1969, 1970a, 1970b, 
1972a. The previous  r e p o r t s  most c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p re sen t  paper 
a r e  Lodhi 1971, Lodhi and T i l l y  1971 and C .  T i l l y  1972b. 
2 .  For reviews of t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  s e e  Bienen 1968, Gurr 1970, Corne l ius  
1971, Nelson 1969, 1970, T i l l y  and.Rule 1965, C.  T i l l y .1964 .  Some c l e a r  
examples of. .what w e  mean by " s t r u c t u r a l "  arguments appear  i n  Stinchcombe 
1965, Rude 1970 '~  Wolf 1969. . For. " tension" arguments s e e  e s p e c i a l l y  
Srnelser 1963, Gurr 1970, Kornhauser 1959, Davies 1962. 
. . 
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